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It is a widely held opinion that apprenticeship training represents a net investment for training 
firms, and that therefore firms only train if they have the possibility to recoup these 
investments after the training period. A recent study using a new firm-level dataset for 
Switzerland showed, however, that for 60 percent of the firms, the apprenticeship training 
itself does not result in net cost. In this context it seems important to examine the question 
whether the potential net cost of training (during the training period) are a major determinant 
for the demand for apprentices. Different count data models, in particular hurdle models, are 
used to estimate the effect of net cost on the demand for apprentices. The results show that the 
net cost has a significant impact on the training decision but no significant influence on the 
demand for apprentices, once the firm has decided to train. For policy purposes, these results 
indicate that subsidies for firms that already train apprentices would not boost the demand for 
apprentices. 
JEL Code: J24, C25. 
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The study is based on two surveys financed by the Commission for Technology and 
Innovation (CTI credit 4289.1 BFS and 5630.1 BFS) with the help of the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office and carried out in tandem with a similar survey in Germany conducted by 
the Federal Institute of Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung) in Bonn. 1 Introduction
Every year, almost 70,000 or more than half of the Swiss youngsters who complete their compul-
sory schooling choose to embark on what is called the dual education system, that is, a training
programme combining vocational education at school with training in and work for a company.
In order to guarantee each new cohort of school leavers that there is a suﬃcient number of ﬁrms
willing to oﬀer training opportunities, it is important to know which factors aﬀect the demand for
apprentices. From an economic point of view, it seems obvious that a ﬁrm would hire the more
apprentices the higher the net beneﬁt of apprenticeship training amounts to. So far, most studies
suggested that apprenticeship training results in net cost during the apprenticeship (e.g. Beicht et
al. 2004). This would imply that companies need to be able to recoup these net cost by employing
graduated apprentices as skilled workers and paying them a wage lower than the value of their
marginal productivity, because otherwise they would not oﬀer an apprenticeship programme.
The most recent study of the Swiss apprenticeship system shows, unlike other studies, that about
two thirds of the training ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to train apprentices (Schweri et al. 2003). This
suggests that for the majority of training ﬁrms, the possibility to recoup the investment during the
apprenticeship training period is an important factor explaining their availability for training. That
not every single company is able to oﬀer apprenticeship posts under the same favourable conditions
was subsequently pointed out by Wolter et al. (2003), who showed that the potential net cost of
non-training ﬁrms would be positive and considerably higher than those of training companies, if
they were to engage in training apprentices. These observations lead to the hypothesis that, at
least in Switzerland where the high ﬂexibility of the labour market puts some restrictions on the
possibilities for ﬁrms to recoup training expenses after the training period has ended, the net cost
of training during the training period is a decisive argument in favour or against the training of
apprentices.
This paper extends the analyses made so far in testing directly whether the (potential) net cost
of training during the training period explain the training probability of ﬁrms. Furthermore, it is
estimated whether the net cost of training also aﬀect the demand for apprentices, once the decision
1to train has been made. We use diﬀerent types of count data models to account for the speciﬁc
structure underlying the demand for apprentices.
The paper ﬁlls a gap in the training literature, as all previous studies (see section 3) estimating
the demand for apprentices with ﬁrm-level data were not able to include data on the cost and
beneﬁt of the apprenticeship training in their analyses because of the lack of these data. The only
exception known to the authors is a study by Niederalt et al. (2001), using, however, a very small
and non-representative sample of ﬁrms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses brieﬂy the apprenticeship system in
Switzerland. Section 3 summarizes previous studies and motivates the hypothesis tested in this
paper. Section 4 introduces the data and the sample design. In Section 5, (potential) net cost are
estimated using a maximum likelihood selection model. Then, the eﬀect of net cost on the demand
for apprentices is estimated using diﬀerent types of count data models. Section 6 concludes.
2 The apprenticeship system in Switzerland
The apprenticeship system is the route chosen by about 60 percent of the Swiss youngsters at upper
secondary level. More than 180,000 adolescents are currently embarked on what is called the dual
education system, that is, a training programme combining vocational education at school with
training in and work for a company. Almost half of the remaining 40 percent of young people who
complete compulsory education go on to attend grammar school (Gymnasium) to prepare them for
university and a more academic career. The remainder opt either for other entirely school-based
forms of education or pursues no form of post-compulsory education, placing Switzerland ahead of
other OECD countries in terms of the percentage of the over-16 population attending any form of
non-compulsory schooling.
Vocational training in a dual-education program usually lasts three to four years. Drop-out rates
were fairly low in the past. Based on the responses of training ﬁrms in the survey used for this article,
the drop out rates were on average 5 percent. Apprentices graduate with a diploma recognized
throughout Switzerland attesting that the apprentice has a professional qualiﬁcation. The quality
2of the training provided in Switzerland, which combines school lessons (1-2 days a week) with
on-the-job training in a ﬁrm under the supervision of certiﬁed staﬀ, is recognized internationally
as meeting top standards. International comparisons show, in terms of scholastic and professional
qualiﬁcations, that Swiss apprentices are more than a match for their upper secondary level peers
attending school full-time (see e.g. Bierhoﬀ and Prais 1997).
The employment period ends automatically on completion of training. Any extension of the
employment period must be negotiated in a separate contract. Switzerland diﬀers in this respect
from some other countries where apprentices are protected from dismissal for a period of time
after completing their training. Mobility is fairly high among young people who complete their
apprenticeship, with only 36 percent still working at their original training site one year on (see
Schweri et al. 2003).1
3 Previous studies
There have been several studies on the demand for apprentices using ﬁrm-level data in the last few
years, but most of them did not include data on the cost-beneﬁt ratio of apprenticeship training on
the ﬁrm-level. Some of the studies described below used proxies for the cost-beneﬁt ratio instead,
others have simply ignored this possibility.
Harhoﬀ and Kane (1997) found for Germany that “ﬁrms are much more willing to train when
there are fewer ﬁrms around to poach their trainees” (p.184). They also showed that ﬁrms are
less likely to train or train less apprentices if the work force in counties, or counties in commuting
distance, is large.
Neub¨ aumer and Bellmann (1999) also examined German ﬁrms without data on cost and beneﬁt.
Their data set contained, however, qualitative assessments by the non-training ﬁrms of the factors
aﬀecting the training decision. Their ﬁndings were, that about two thirds of the ﬁrms do not
train because they do not meet the legal requirements for oﬀering apprenticeship training. For
1In Germany, the corresponding ﬁgure is closer to 50 percent, see Winkelmann (1996) and Euwals and Winkelmann
(2002).
3the remaining third of the non-training companies, an unfavourable cost-beneﬁt ratio was one of
the main reasons not to train. Further, the analysis of the training intensity of training ﬁrms
showed that the ﬁrm size is the major factor explaining the ratio of apprentices and total number
of employees. Similar to Switzerland, the majority of all apprentices in Germany are trained by
small ﬁrms with less than 50 employees. Wolter and Schweri (2002) found similar results for the
training intensity amongst training ﬁrms in Switzerland, but in addition, the net cost of training
also had a signiﬁcant impact, even if other factors like the ﬁrmsize or the training profession were
accounted for.2 This result goes in line with the observation made by Neub¨ aumer and Bellmann
(1999) that the training intensity was particularly high in industries where previous studies (see
Bardeleben et al. 1995) had shown low or even negative net costs for apprentices.3
St¨ oger and Winter-Ebmer (2001) found that the number of apprentices trained in Austria
declined over time, but they were not able to ﬁnd explanations for this time-trend. As in Germany
and Switzerland, they observed that large ﬁrms are more likely to train apprentices, but the intensity
of training is the highest for small ﬁrms.
In a diﬀerent type of analysis, Foug` ere and Schwerdt (2002), comparing the French and the
German apprenticeship system, analysed the determinants of ﬁrms’ demand for apprentices. Using
a production function approach, they found evidence that apprentices participate signiﬁcantly in
the production process only in medium size ﬁrms. They conclude from this result, that small and
large ﬁrms train apprentices less for the motive of exploiting the value of their productivity, but
rather because of their diﬃculty to ﬁnd skilled workers on the external labour market.
Beckmann (2002) ﬁnally used a zero-inﬂated negative binominal model to test the implications
of the theory proposed by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, 1999b) for ﬁrms from West and
East Germany. He deﬁned two regimes, one where ﬁrms will never train apprentices, and a second
regime, in which ﬁrms can both train zero or a positive number of apprentices. He found evidence
that a high degree of estimated wage compression encourages ﬁrms to train apprentices. His ﬁndings
2Niederalt et al. (2001) found similar results for a small sample of 27 Bavarian companies for which they had
calculated the cost of apprenticeship training.
3An assessment of the German situation was repeated in an analysis made by Dietrich (2000).
4apply only for companies for which he assumed positive net costs of apprenticeship training, as he
excluded ﬁrms from his sample for which he assumed zero or negative net cost of training (companies
with less than ﬁve employees). Such a reduction of the sample of analysed ﬁrms is in our view
inappropriate to analyse the overall decision of ﬁrms to train apprentices, both in Germany and
Switzerland. Furthermore, with the data used in this study, such assumptions are not necessary as
the net cost of training can be included directly in the estimation of the demand for apprentices.
4 Data
The data used here is from two representative surveys conducted in Swiss ﬁrms in the year 2001
by the Centre for Research in Economics of Education at the University of Berne and the Swiss
Federal Statistical Oﬃce (see Schweri et al, 2003 or Wolter and Schweri 2002). In one survey,
training ﬁrms were asked about their cost and beneﬁt of apprenticeship training. In the second
survey, non-training ﬁrms were asked to ﬁll in the identical questionnaire as training ﬁrms, but
without the questions directly related to the costs and beneﬁts of training.
The original dataset contains 2352 training ﬁrms and 2230 non-training ﬁrms, but the public
sector has been excluded, because the proﬁt-maximizing principle does not fully apply to such ﬁrms.
Also excluded are ﬁrms that cannot make independent decisions about training because they are
part of a larger enterprise. The dataset used in this paper embraces 1971 training ﬁrms and 1661
non-training ﬁrms. Table A (in the appendix) shows the means and standard deviations of the
variables.
For training ﬁrms, net cost, i.e. cost minus beneﬁts, were derived as follows: the main parts
of cost are the wages of apprentices and the cost for the training personnel, which together add
up to about 90 percent of total cost. The remainder are cost for material, infrastructure and
other. The beneﬁts are calculated by the type of work the apprentices perform. This beneﬁt is
broken down into production activities that would otherwise be performed by unskilled workers
or skilled workers. While we can assume in the ﬁrst case that the apprentice’s performance has
the same value as that of an unskilled worker, for the second case the value of the apprentice’s
5performance is compared to that of a fully trained skilled worker.4 Figure 1 (in the appendix)
shows the distribution of net cost for the 1971 training ﬁrms. The average is negative (beneﬁts
exceed costs) at CHF -6,174. Net cost are negative for 60 percent of all training ﬁrms.
5 Econometric models and empirical analysis
In order to estimate the eﬀect of net cost of training on the training decision, we require the
potential net cost for currently non-training ﬁrms, which we naturally cannot observe. Hence,
we need to estimate these counterfactual costs, and the ﬁrst subsection shows how to do that.
In the next subsection, we present diﬀerent count data models that can be used to estimate the
eﬀect of predicted net cost on the demand for apprentices. A particular feature of the data is the
high proportion of zeros, i.e., the large fraction of non-training ﬁrms. In a demand context, these
observations represent a corner solution. Therefore, we concentrate on count data models for corner
solutions, so-called “hurdle models”. A useful property of these models in the present context is
that they allow us to distinguish between cost elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins.
The third subsection presents the results.
5.1 Estimation of potential net cost
The net cost of training are observed only for training ﬁrms. To use these costs to estimate the
potential cost of training for currently non-training ﬁrms, we have to realize that training ﬁrms
are not a random sample from the universe of all ﬁrms, and that training and non-training ﬁrms
may diﬀer systematically in observable and unobservable characteristics. In order to account for
observable diﬀerences, we use a linear regression framework according to which
y1j = x0
1jβ1 + ε1j j = 1,...,3632 (1)
where y1j are net cost and x1j is a vector containing variables concerning ﬁrm size, number of
skilled workers, industry, apprenticeship profession, region, ownership of the ﬁrm and a variable
4For more details on the cost and beneﬁt model used in this study see Wolter et al. (2003) or Schweri et al. (2003).
6indicating whether a ﬁrm would like to reduce the time an apprentice spends in vocational school.5
We don’t estimate a log-linear model because net cost can be positive as well as negative. If ˆ β1




However, direct estimation of (??) by ordinary least squares using training ﬁrms only leads to






1 if ﬁrm j trains
0 if ﬁrm j does not train
(2)
Selection bias arises if E(ε1j|y2j = 1) 6= E(ε1j|y2j = 0). We follow here the standard Heckman
formulation with a latent continuous variable for the training decision:
y2j = 1 1[x0
2jβ2 + ε2j < 0] (3)
This is a reduced form version of the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization condition, according to which
ﬁrms train as long as the marginal beneﬁt of doing so is positive. The beneﬁt of training has two
components. First, an immediate beneﬁt arises if the net cost of training are negative. Secondly,
a beneﬁt can arise in later periods, for example because the ﬁrm needs skilled workers and it may
be diﬃcult to recruit such workers in the outside labour market. This reasoning implies that x2j
should include all determinants of net cost x1j. These variables obviously aﬀect the decision to
train, although not necessarily through their inﬂuence on net cost only. They may also have an
indirect eﬀect, by aﬀecting other aspects of the training decision. In addition x2j includes a variable
measuring the tightness of the labor market for skilled workers (the exclusion restriction). This
variable, a dummy indicating whether a ﬁrm has diﬃculties ﬁnding skilled workers on the labour
market, does not inﬂuence the net cost of the apprenticeship training but it is expected to have a
signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁrm’s decision to train when the net cost of the apprenticeship training
alone would be positive.
5The last variable will be used later on to identify the cost elasticity in a structural demand model. It is assumed
to aﬀect demand only through net cost.
7If we moreover assume that
























for training ﬁrms, and







for non-training ﬁrms, where σ12 denotes the covariance between the error in the net cost equation
and the error in the training equation. If ρ = σ12/σ1 6= 0, then the expected value of the error term
is E(ε1j|x1j,y2j = 1) 6= 0, and the self-selection problem results in biased estimates in the standard
regression using training ﬁrms only. A positive ρ implies that the higher the unobserved net cost
component ε1j, the less likely is the training condition (??) satisﬁed, i.e., the lower the probability
of training. The net cost of training ﬁrms then underestimate the average net cost, as seen in (??).
To solve the problem, a maximum likelihood estimation procedure can be applied, where the
contribution of ﬁrm j to the log likelihood function (see Wooldridge 2002) is


























The estimation results are given in Table 1. The estimated ρ is positive indeed, so that training
ﬁrms self-select based on absolute cost advantage. The point estimate is 0.5, and a Wald test for
the null hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0 has a p-value of 0.0013, so that the null is rejected.
8Table 1: MLE selection model, Dependent variable: Net cost of training
Net Cost Training yes/no
Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
Industrial sector -1510.6 (2687.3) 0.145† (0.066)
Construction sector -7799.4† (3579.8) 0.329† (0.087)
French part of Switzerland 1733.4 (2580.1) -0.240† (0.060)
Italian part of Switzerland 8479.1 (5750.7) 0.044 (0.144)
Profession:
Commercial employee -12184.5† (2705.4) -0.162† (0.065)
Electromechanics technician -50675.5† (6150.5) 0.101 (0.174)
Polymechanics technician 24259.5† (4781.7) -0.380† (0.135)
Cook 6976.6 (5686.0) -0.918 (0.136)
IT specialist 10968.9 (5764.4) -0.508† (0.138)
Mason -8595.4 (6289.2) -0.653† (0.168)
Architectural draftsperson -17458.1† (5779.9) 0.542† (0.136)
Salesperson (2 year) -4930.8 (5735.7) -0.874 (0.133)
Salesperson (3 year) -7171.0 (7296.3) 0.208 (0.178)
Carpenter -22790.2† (6462.1) 0.377† (0.175)
Auto mechanic 4007.9 (7396.1) 0.199 (0.184)
Hairdresser -25836.7† (7627.9) 1.051† (0.201)
Oﬃce worker -5755.4 (7861.2) -0.421† (0.154)
Assistant in a doctor’s oﬃce -10143.9 (7498.6) 0.506* (0.163)
Automation technician 20615.2† (7777.4) 0.574† (0.293)
Electronics technician 24008.1† (8739.7) -0.190 (0.264)
Structural draftsperson -34250.5† (7904.6) 0.725† (0.232)
Firm-characteristics:
Foreign-owned company 5617.6 (3212.0) -0.615† (0.074)
Firm size: 4-9 employees -3631.6 (3561.6) 0.168† (0.069)
Firm size: 10-49 employees -6742.8 (4148.2) 0.362† (0.085)
Firm size: 50-100 employees -8341.6 (5029.0) 0.862† (0.109)
Firm size: >100 employees -4287.8 (5499.7) 1.104† (0.121)
Reduction in school days 8327.6† (3753.6) -0.368† (0.082)
Number of skilled workers (ln) -2498.7† (1095.1) 0.317† (0.031)
Diﬃculties in ﬁnding qualiﬁed labor 0.303† (0.049)





†Eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The reference site is a Swiss-owned company located
in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, has more than 100 employees, and trains apprentices
in the category “Other occupations” in the service sector.
9If we use the selectivity-corrected net cost estimates in column 1 of Table 1, we ﬁnd that the
predicted net cost of an average apprenticeship program of a randomly drawn ﬁrm in Switzerland
amounts to about CHF 13,608.6 Of course, there is considerable variation across ﬁrms, as seen in
Figure 2 (in the appendix) which shows a histogram of the predicted net cost of training and non-
training ﬁrms. The predictions are now based on (??) and thus conditional on x1j but unconditional
on the training decision. As expected, predicted net cost tend to be higher for non-training ﬁrms
than for training ﬁrms - the averages are CHF 18,540 and CHF 9,453, respectively. However, there
is considerable overlap in the two distributions. 5.45 percent of all non-training ﬁrms (about 8,090
ﬁrms), are predicted to have negative net cost and still do not train. At the point of time of
the survey some 5,000 oﬀered training posts were not ﬁlled because of a lack of either no or not
appropriate applicants. Therefore we suppose that more than half of these non-training ﬁrms with
negative net cost did not train because of this reason. The rest of these ﬁrms – according to the
model, must have a positive unobserved cost component.
In the following analysis, the predicted net cost – unconditional on the training decision – are
used as an explanatory variable in a structural model in order to estimate the cost elasticity of the
demand for apprentices. Since the dependent variable, the number of apprentices, is a count, we
discuss ﬁrst appropriate econometric models for non-negative integer valued random variables.
5.2 Count data models for demand of apprentices
Let nj = 0,1,2,... denote the number of apprentices employed by ﬁrm j and remember that ˆ y1j
are the predicted net cost (these can be both positive or negative). The main objects of interest







6These results diﬀer from the results in Wolter et al. (2003) because in this paper no weights are used. The use
of weights is not required to obtain consistent estimates of the regression parameters although diﬀerences in small
samples occur. From a qualitative point of view, the results remain the same with or without the use of weights. The
weights have been dropped since some of the following count data models have not been implemented for use with
weights.







Since E(nj) = P(nj > 0)E(nj|nj > 0) it follows that the overall cost elasticity equals η1 + η2.
We will estimate these elasticities from count data models since nj is a non negative integer. The
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We see immediately that η2 = γˆ y1j − η1. This tight functional relationship between η1 and η2 is
a direct consequence of the assumption that the same distributional model (and the same set of
parameters) generates zeros and positive counts. This assumption needs to be relaxed if one wants
to test separately for the statistical signiﬁcance of intrinsic and extrinsic cost elasticities – as we
do. The econometric tools that allows one to perform such separate tests are the class of so-called
hurdle models (Mullahy, 1986).
A hurdle model combines a binary model for the training decision with a truncated-at-one
count data model for the number of apprentices employed by training ﬁrms. A reduced form binary
training decision was already modelled before, in equation (??). In keeping with the previous model
assumptions, the “structural” training decision equation is again of a standard probit form, this
time including the predicted net cost ˆ y1j. In order to capture the indirect eﬀect of the exogenous
variables on the training decision, they are included separately, although one exclusion restriction
11is needed for identiﬁcation. We assume that the regressors x3j are the same as x2j except that the
variable “reduction in vocational school time is desired (yes/no)” is excluded.
The probability function of the counts is then
P(nj|x3j, ˆ y1j) =

   
   
1 − Φ(x0
3jδ1 + γ1ˆ y1j) nj = 0
Φ(x0
3jδ1 + γ1ˆ y1j)
f(nj|x3j, ˆ y1j)
1 − f(0|x3j, ˆ y1j)
nj = 1,2,...
(7)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Here, f(nj)
can be any proper conditional distribution model for count data. The most prominent examples
are the Poisson distribution and the negative binomial distribution (Winkelmann, 2003). Among
these two, the negative binomial model is usually prefered (and the Poisson model is rejected by
formal tests) because it allows for unobserved heterogeneity that is an important feature of almost
all economic data. Assume that
λj = exp(x0
3jδ2 + γ2ˆ y1j + uj) (8)
where exp(uj) is gamma distributed independently of x3j and ˆ y1j. If nj|uj is Poisson distributed,
then the unconditional model nj can be shown to be negative binomial.
However, it has been argued elsewhere (Winkelmann, 2004) that a more suitable model for
incorporating unobserved heterogeneity is the Poisson log-normal model. This model assumes
that conditional on uj, nj is Poisson distributed with parameter λj deﬁned as in (??). Moreover,
uj ∼ Normal(0,σ2
u). In previous empirical applications, the Poisson log-normal model usually
outperformed the negative binomial model based on selection criteria for non-nested models. If
the Poisson log-normal model is combined with a probit hurdle as in (??), we obtain the probit-
Poisson-log-normal model (PPLN) with individual likelihood contribution
f(nj) = [1 − Φ(x0













where φ denoted the standard normal density. The parameters δ1, δ2, γ1, γ2 and σ2
u can be jointly
estimated by maximum likelihood. A useful property of all standard hurdle models is that the
12log-likelihood function has two additive parts L1(δ1,γ1) and L2(δ2,γ2,σ2
u) that can be maximized
separately with respect to the corresponding parameters. In the probit Poisson log-normal model
described here, ˆ δ1 and ˆ γ1 are obtained from estimating a probit model with all data whereas the
remaining parameters are obtained by maximizing a truncated-at-zero Poisson log-normal model
using observations on training ﬁrms only. Although the integral in this second part has no analytical
solution and thus requires numerical integration, this can be readily done using the Gauss-Hermite
method.7
We can now return to the question of the elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins.
For the extensive margin, the cost elasticity is readily calculated as
η1 =
φ(x0
3jδ1 + γ1ˆ y1j)
Φ(x0
3jδ1 + γ1ˆ y1j)
γ1ˆ y1j
The demand elasticity for training ﬁrms cannot be calculated in closed form. However, it can be
computed numerically.
5.3 Results
We will concentrate our discussion on the estimation results for the PPLN model. We also estimated
a number of alternative available count data models, as mentioned earlier. Speciﬁcation tests
showed that the PPLN model ﬁts the data best. First, the Poisson model has a log-likelihood of
-8899.9, compared to a log-likelihood of -5426.7 of the negative binomial model. The two models
are nested with one restriction, and a likelihood ratio test therefore clearly rejects the Poisson
assumption of no unobserved heterogeneity. Next, the simple negative binomial model was tested
against the negative binomial model with hurdle (log-likelihood -5332.7). With 31 restrictions, the
likelihood ratio test statistic has a p-value of zero. This result means that in this application, it
is important to estimate the parameters for the training decision separately from those for the
quantity decision among training ﬁrms. Diﬀerent mechanisms are at work, and imposing a single
probability model for both extensive and intensive margins would lead to spurious interpretations.
7An extension of the model allows for correlation between uj and the error in the probit part of the model, leading
to the Probit Poisson-log-normal model with correlated errors (Winkelmann, 2004). In this case, the log-likelihood
function can no longer be maximized separately.
13Table 2: Demand for apprentices – Probit Poisson log-normal model
Structural Probit Poisson log-normal
(training yes/no) (# apprentices 1+)
Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
Industrial sector 0.072 (0.067) -0.061 (0.063)
Construction sector -0.013 (0.116) -0.111 (0.118)
French part of Switzerland -0.150† (0.062) -0.465† (0.067)
Italian part of Switzerland 0.374† (0.169) -0.371† (0.156)
Profession:
Commercial employee -0.723† (0.134) -0.263† (0.129)
Polymechanics technician 0.667† (0.280) 0.288 (0.250)
IT specialist -0.056 (0.176) -0.096 (0.153)
Cook 0.222 (0.153) 0.101 (0.150)
Electromechanics technician -2.161† (0.533) 1.016† (0.492)
Mason -1.032† (0.190) -0.168 (0.157)
Architectural draftsperson -0.252 (0.216) -0.140 (0.246)
Salesperson (2 year) -0.305† (0.141) 0.086 (0.144)
Auto mechanic 0.390† (0.189) 0.648† (0.157)
Carpenter -0.635† (0.286) 0.214 (0.265)
Salesperson (3 year) -0.106 (0.190) 0.208 (0.180)
Oﬃce worker -0.673† (0.163) -0.866† (0.311)
Assistant in a doctor’s oﬃce 0.053 (0.190) -0.019 (0.291)
Structural draftsperson -0.808† (0.407) 0.127 (0.377)
Hairdresser -0.065 (0.324) 0.886† (0.305)
Automation technician 1.457† (0.368) 0.576† (0.247)
Electronics technician 0.877† (0.353) 0.365 (0.275)
Firm-characteristics:
Foreign-owned company -0.373† (0.091) -0.044 (0.080)
Firm size: 4-9 employees 0.013 (0.078) 0.081 (0.133)
Firm size: 10-49 employees 0.063 (0.109) 0.346† (0.149)
Firm size: 50-100 employees 0.500† (0.137) 0.496† (0.161)
Firm size: >100 employees 0.919† (0.129) 0.823† (0.152)
Number of skilled workers (ln) 0.208† (0.040) 0.522† (0.033)
Diﬃculties in ﬁnding qualiﬁed workers 0.291† (0.050) 0.080 (0.049)
Net cost of training (in thousands) -0.044† (0.010) 0.001 (0.009)




†Eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
14After we settled for hurdle models, we ﬁnally compared the negative binomial model with hurdle
and the PPLN. The two models are not nested. However, since the log-likelihood of the PPLN is
-5262.1, and since it has one parameter less than the negative binomial hurdle model, it is clearly
the better ﬁtting hurdle model.
Table 2 shows all regression coeﬃcients for the PPLN model. The ﬁrst column gives the probit
coeﬃcients, whereas the third column shows the coeﬃcients for the truncated-at-zero Poisson log-
normal model. The main parameter of interest is the structural eﬀect of net cost. The regression
parameter is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the hurdle part but practically zero for the
positives. This means that an increase in net cost reduces the probability of oﬀering (any) training,
but such an increase is unrelated to the number of apprentices a ﬁrm trains, once it has decided
to train. A potential economic explanation for this pattern is that small ﬁrms who train a small
number of apprentices have in general lower net cost of training than large ﬁrms training many
apprentices. Although training is lucrative for small ﬁrms, their demand for apprentices is limited
by an upper bound that depends on the number of skilled workers able to train apprentices. If
they would extend their demand beyond that limit, the additional need for trainers (and additional
infrastructure) would result in positive marginal net cost for an additional apprentice. Large ﬁrms
with positive net cost of training are not sensitive to marginal variations, because the number of
apprentices is determined by the number of future vacancies for skilled workers. In this situation, a
reduction in the net cost of training would only translate into an additional demand for apprentices
if the marginal net cost of training were smaller than the marginal beneﬁt for the period after
the apprenticeship. The latter depends on the probability that the ﬁrm is able to oﬀer its former
apprentice a job. This together leads to the result that once a ﬁrm has decided to train apprentices,
the number of apprentices does not depend on marginal variations in the net costs of training. The
eﬀect of net cost is therefore entirely restricted to the extensive margin.
To put a quantitative meaning on the estimated coeﬃcient of -0.044, we can compute the elas-
ticity at the average values of the regressors. In this case, ˆ η1 = −0.45 - a one percent increase in
the net cost reduces the probability of training by 0.45 percent. Obviously, these marginal elastic-
15ities should not be extrapolated too far, as the probit model is highly non-linear. Alternatively,
we can consider absolute percentage point changes in the probability of training. For example,
starting again from average values, an increase in net training cost by one thousand will reduce the
probability of training by 1.8 percentage points. Similarly, an increase in net training cost by one
standard deviation reduces the probability of training by 27.4 percentage points.
In order to summarize the main result of the analysis, we ﬁnd that the elasticity at the intensive
margin is zero, whereas the estimated elasticity at the extensive margin amounts to -0.45, an
economically substantial eﬀect. We conclude by mentioning some of the other results. Firm size,
measured by the number of employees, and the number of skilled workers have the expexted positive
eﬀects on both the probability of training and on the number of apprentices among training ﬁrms.
Foreign owned ﬁrms are less likely to train, as are ﬁrms in the French speaking part of Switzerland.
The training ﬁrms in the French part in addition train fewer apprentices – for given ﬁrm size, net
cost, etc.– than otherwise similar ﬁrms in the German speaking part of Switzerland. These results
largely conﬁrm those from previous studies.
5.4 A simulation for subsidies
In the year 2000, the year of reference of our survey, about 74’500 new apprentices were employed
by Swiss ﬁrms, but not every school leaver interested in apprenticeship training was able to ﬁnd a
training position. In subsequent years, the gap between the number of school leavers interested in
apprenticeship training and the number of available apprenticeship positions increased steadily due
to the unfavorable general economic climate. Political initiatives tried to ﬁght the imbalance in the
apprenticeship market with the idea of subsidizing ﬁrms for their training. Taking into account our
ﬁndings, the subsidy should be given to non-training ﬁrms, where it would have a large eﬀect, but
not to training ﬁrms, where it would have no eﬀect at all. A cost subsidy to a non-training ﬁrm
would reduce net cost of training and thereby increase the probability to oﬀer a training position.
The question remains how much such a program would cost.
In the year 2004, according to the ”Lehrstellenbarometer 2004”, some 8,000 interested school
16leavers did not succeed in ﬁnding a training position. With an average of 1.04 newly created
apprenticeship posts per training ﬁrm, one would need to attract 7,666 new training ﬁrms, an
increase in the proportion of training ﬁrms by 3.66 percentage points. As shown in the previous
section, the training ratio increases by 1.8 percentage points for each reduction in cost by CHF
1,000. Thus, the targeted increase by 3.66 percentage points requires a subsidy of CHF 1,949 per
apprentice.
Of course, it would be diﬃcult in practice to assess whether a given ﬁrm would have oﬀered no
training post in the absence of a subsidy, and thus to discriminate between ﬁrms who do already
train apprentices and new ﬁrms when deciding whom to oﬀer the training subsidies. In the spirit
of our model, one would need to have detailed information on the net cost of training for that ﬁrm.
However, ﬁrms can be expected to respond strategically and overstate their true cost once such a
scheme would be in place. Therefore all known political initiatives demanding subsidies for training
start with the idea that each training post would be subsidized, and not only the “additional” ones.
This windfall gain for “old” training companies creates as a consequence much higher total costs of
the subsidy than a regime that could be targeted at the new companies only. As a consequence the
subsidies alone would amount to more than CHF 17,000 per newly created apprenticeship position.
Table 3: Subsidy simulation
New apprenticeship Total cost of Subsidy per newly Total cost per
positions subsidies created apprenticeship apprenticeship
(in Mio CHF) position (in CHF) position (in CHF)
8,000 139.7 17,463 62,463
1,000 15.8 15,758 60,758
10,000 179.5 17,950 62,950
The amount depends on the number of newly created apprenticeship positions but is basically
driven by the total number of training ﬁrms. To illustrate this, a scenario with an additional
1,000 and another scenario with 10,000 additional new apprenticeship positions is shown in Table
3. To the costs of subsidies, the costs of school for an apprentice must be added, which amount on
average to CHF 15,000 per year. The total cost of education (subsidy included) of an additionally
17trained apprentice would be more than CHF 60,000. For purposes of comparison, the total costs
for the highest form of a full-time general education in Switzerland (Gymnasium) are on average
CHF 58,500 for a 3-year period. Taking into account that the administration of such subsidies
would generate additional costs of 10 to 20 percent of the total amount of subsidies, the “artiﬁcial”
creation of new apprenticeship positions through subsidies seems already questionable from a cost
point of view.
6 Concluding remarks
The paper has made both a methodological and a substantive contribution. On the methodological
side, it is the ﬁrst time that the ﬁrm’s demand for apprentices is modelled in a structural framework.
In this empirical framework, the main parameter of interest, the cost elasticity of demand, can be
identiﬁed from observing cost data for training ﬁrms alone. The problem that costs cannot be
observed for non-training ﬁrms is overcome by using predictions from a selectivity corrected cost
equation. A hurdle count data model is then used to estimate the structural demand equation,
so that cost elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins can be estimated separately. To
estimate the model, we employed a unique ﬁrm-level dataset that includes training and currently
non-training ﬁrms and provides detailed cost information for training ﬁrms.
The results are quite striking. We ﬁnd that the cost elasticity at the extensive margin, i.e.
with regards to the probability whether to train or not to train, amounts to -0.45, an economically
substantial eﬀect. By contrast, the cost elasticity at the intensive margin, i.e. for the number of
apprentices among training ﬁrms, is zero.
We close with the substantive conclusion that in order to increase the demand for apprentices,
i.e. the number of apprenticeship positions oﬀered each year, one would need to direct subsidies
at non-training ﬁrms and exclude training ﬁrms. In this case, the required subsidy would be quite
modest. If, however, such a discrimination is politically and practically infeasible, the costs for
creating additional apprenticeship positions would be prohibitively high.
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21Appendices
Table A: Sample descriptives
(N=3632; sampling weights have been used.)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Training ﬁrm 0.291 0.454
Number of apprentices 0.675 3.878
Firm size 1-3 0.331 0.471
Firm size 4-9 0.403 0.491
Firm size 10-49 0.224 0.417
Firm size 50-99 0.023 0.151
Firm size >100 0.019 0.135
ln (Number of skilled workers) 0.313 3.035
Sector: Service 0.679 0.467
Industry 0.136 0.343
Construction 0.119 0.324
German part of Switzerland 0.750 0.433
French part of Switzerland 0.222 0.416
Italian part of Switzerland 0.029 0.167
Foreign ﬁrm ownership 0.116 0.320
Diﬃculties in ﬁnding qualiﬁed labor 0.403 0.491
Reduction in school days 0.113 0.317
Commercial employee 0.177 0.381
Polymechanics technician 0.019 0.136
IT specialist 0.028 0.164
Cook 0.070 0.255
Electromechanics technician 0.020 0.139
Mason 0.025 0.157
Architectural draftsperson 0.030 0.171
Salesperson (2 years) 0.062 0.242
Salesperson (3 years) 0.026 0.159
Auto mechanic 0.020 0.141
Carpenter 0.025 0.155
Oﬃce worker 0.033 0.180
Assistant in a doctor’s oﬃce 0.021 0.145
Structural draftsperson 0.010 0.100
Hairdresser 0.017 0.129
Automation technician 0.004 0.063
Electronics technician 0.004 0.064
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Figure 2: Overlapping histograms for predicted net cost of training ﬁrms (light color) and non-
training ﬁrms (dark color)
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